




With the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe and the
opening of China, the percentage of the world popu-
lation integrated with the Western trading system has
increased dramatically. Regions with very different
endowments of capital and labour as well as very dif-
ferent commodity price ratios have been merged, cre-
ating huge potentials for gains from trade. And inter-
national trade indeed has grown rapidly. While world
GDP increased by 50 percent in nominal terms from
1990 to 2002, the trading volume grew by 90 percent.
Among the increasing trading activities, international
outsourcing and offshoring activities have received
particular attention in the public debate in Western
countries. Both relate to the so-called intra-industry
trade of intermediate products. Outsourcing means
that domestic firms give up parts of their intermediate
production chains and instead buy parts from foreign
suppliers (Feenstra and Hansen 2001). Offshoring
means that domestic firms set up new factories abroad
to produce the intermediary products themselves.1 As
the economic implications of these two phenomena
are the same, we treat the two equally in our analysis.
Both phenomena involve a reduction in domestic pro-
duction depth. Downstream activities close to con-
sumers such as the final assembly of parts typically
remain in the country, but labour-intensive upstream
activities are often moved abroad in order to benefit
from lower wages. Cars are good examples. Renault,
Porsche and Audi are national brand names that
require national content. But in fact, parts from
Nissan or from own plants in Slovakia and Hungary
account for substantial fractions of the value added.
An extreme example is a car like the Porsche Cayenne.
The car appears to be produced in Leipzig. However,
in Leipzig only the steering, the gear box and a few
other parts are added, while the main assembly line as
such is in Bratislava. Leipzig accounts for only 12 per-
cent of the value of the Cayenne; 88 percent of the
value is already contained in what comes from
Bratislava. 
Comprehensive empirical information on outsourcing
and offshoring developments in the United States is
provided by Feenstra (1996). Reviewing evidence of
long-run changes in trade and production structures
in manufacturing, he finds that there have been ten-
dencies for more use of imported intermediate inputs
in production. Related results have been obtained by
Hild (2004) and Sinn (2004a) for Germany (see the
appendix to this chapter).
Outsourcing and offshoring activities not only apply to
production for domestic use but also to production for
exports. Increasing fractions of the value added con-
tent of exports seem to be coming from abroad indicat-
ing that trade in intermediaries is growing even faster
than trade on average. Evidence for this is given by Ng
and Yeats (2002). They show that between 1984 and
1996 East Asian imports and exports of manufactured
components grew annually two to three times as fast as
imports and exports of traditional production. Related
results have been found for Germany. Sinn called this
the “bazaar economy effect”, a term which has trig-
gered off a wide debate among German researchers.2 If
a country specializes in “bazaar” activities, its factors
of production move from other sectors towards activi-
ties in which their value added rises, but the export and
import volumes rise even faster than this.
International outsourcing and offshoring have gained
importance in Europe since the mid-1990s, in particu-
lar after the ex-communist countries in Eastern
Europe had overcome their transformation crises and
EU membership came in sight. The public in western
EU countries has been alarmed by potential job loss-
es and low-wage competition from the east. By con-
trast, business representatives have tended to play
down these fears, pointing to the advantages the new
1 Offshoring differs from foreign direct investment (FDI) in so far as
FDI need not imply that the goods produced in an owned or partly
owned company abroad are used in the domestic production process,
although this could be the case as well. We follow the definition of
Feenstra and Hansen. See also Feenstra (1996), who speak of out-
sourcing as international production sharing.
2 The term was first used in H.-W. Sinn, Deutsche Rede, Stiftung Neu
Hardenberg, live radio transmission, Deutschland Radio,
15.11.2003, reprinted in Sinn (2004b). An extensive discussion of the
critics’ arguments can be found in Sinn (2005).trading opportunities are creat-
ing and to the possibility of cut-
ting production cost, thus saving
jobs in the west that otherwise
would have been lost. This chap-
ter tries to shed some more light
on this issue. 
2. The decline in the share of
value added in production
Outsourcing and offshoring ac-
tivities, which reduce the
domestic production depth,
seem to be particularly impor-
tant for the manufacturing sec-
tor. Outsourcing of services
which also has received much attention in the
media, does not (yet) seem to be an important
empirical phenomenon.3
The reduction in domestic production depth is
demonstrated quite clearly by the decline in the share
of the manufacturing sector’s value added in its own
production. As Figure 2.1 shows, this decline is a pro-
nounced empirical trend in all other major EU coun-
tries. In Germany, for instance, the own value added
share in production declined from 40 percent in 1970
to less than 34 percent in 2003. 
In principle, the observed deviation of value added
from production could be a result of domestic out-
sourcing to other sectors rather than international
outsourcing and offshoring. In fact, this has been the
position taken by the Financial Times Deutschland in
a series of articles countering the bazaar economy
view.4 However, Table 2.1, which refers to all countries
for which Eurostat data are available, shows that for-
eign outsourcing plays a more than proportionate role
in explaining the development. In all major Western
European countries, the share of foreign intermediate
products in the total value of intermediate products
increased from 1995 to 2000. This shows that the
declining share of value added is indeed primarily due
to the increased share of foreign, rather than domes-
tic, outsourcing activities. 
As the reader can easily verify, the strength of this
development differs among countries with Germany
being more affected than others. The reason could be
that Germany’s geographic and cultural proximity to
the new EU member countries makes it particularly
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Note: Thevalues reported aboverefer to thetotal
economy.
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. The under-
lying data are stored in CIRCA, the Intranet of Euro-
stat, and can be purchased at the Eurostat data shop.
3 For studies on service outsourcing, see Bhagwati et al. (2004) and
Amiti and Wei (2004). The latter paper contains some data on inter-
national outsourcing of services. The authors find that (i) service
outsourcing is still low, though increasing, (ii) some rich countries,
for example USA and UK, have had more “insourcing” of services
than outsourcing, and (iii) in the UK, job growth at the sectoral level
is not negatively related to service outsourcing. Jones and
Kierzkowski (2003) emphasize that the IT revolution and reductions
in regulations have allowed firms to exploit potential increasing
returns in service links between different stages of production. A
cautious conclusion on the significance of service outsourcing might
be that while it is discussed very much in the media, its role in the
aggregate is still relatively small. Naturally, the phenomenon is of far
greater significance for specific firms, jobs and industries. See also
the discussion of outsourcing services in Chapter 1.
4 See e.g. articles “Banker zweifeln an Basar-Ökonomie”, Financial
Times Deutschland 16.7.2004, p. 16, and “Der orientalische Basar
und die deutsche Krise Ökonomen finden neue Erklärung für
Wirtschaftsmisere”, Financial Times Deutschland, 25.6.2004, p. 18.
5 Further indicators for Germany’s special role can be found in Sinn
(2005). EEAG Report 41
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While the Eurostat information in Table 2.1 refers to
the whole economy, the German Statistisches
Bundesamt and the Council of Economic Advisors
recently showed that the same tendency holds true for
total exports as well as for exports of manufacturing
goods.6 From 1991 to 2002, the fraction of foreign
intermediary inputs in German exports, including the
import of exported merchandise, increased from
26.7 percent to 38.8 percent, that is, by about 11 per-
centage points. More than eight of these 11 percent-
age points can be attributed to the period from 1995
to 2002. Similarly, the fraction of foreign intermedi-
ary inputs in the exports of the manufacturing sector
increased from 26.7 percent to 38.1 percent in the
period from 1990 to 2000. We are not aware that sim-
ilar statistical information is available for other coun-
tries, but the tendency is strong enough to expect a
phenomenon of wider importance for many Euro-
pean countries. Regressing real export-induced
imports on real exports, where the export price index
is used as a deflator, the results – published by the
German Federal Statistical Office – imply a marginal
intermediary import propensity of exports of 55 per-
cent. This means that 55 percent of an additional real
euro of German exports is value added coming from
abroad and only 45 percent is produced in Germany.7
Less value added per unit produced in the manufac-
turing sector does not necessarily imply that GDP is
growing more slowly than it otherwise would. A
development towards a bazaar economy could well be
accompanied by an increasing prosperity of the
exporting sector in general and the manufacturing
sector in particular. In principle, at least some coun-
tries could specialise in engineering, final assembly
and industrial sales activities with an ever increasing
share of income earned this way. Figure 2.2 shows a
mixed picture in this regard. While the downward
trend of the manufacturing value added share in GDP
is a general phenomenon for the old EU, there are
substantial differences among the various countries.
Most countries, for instance Italy, Great Britain and
Germany, display long-term reductions in their share
of manufacturing value added in GDP. The overall
decline since 1970 is very pronounced indeed. Only in
France has the share stabilised, albeit at a very low
level. 
Exceptions to the general pattern appear to be Ireland
and Finland. Ireland as one of the fastest growing
economies in Europe has experienced a substantial
increase in the share of manufacturing in total GDP.
In Finland, the share fell up to 1991. However, there-
after it increased over much of the 1990s along with
the “Finish miracle” boom that was particularly dri-
ven by the IT and other high-tech industries.8 The
Finnish and Irish development may also, to some
extent, have to do with the EU single market, which
has removed the disadvantage of a limited domestic
market size from which the smaller European coun-
tries had suffered before. 
Interestingly however, Germany, where the out-
sourcing and offshoring activities are particularly
pronounced, seems to have succeeded in stabilising
the share of manufacturing value added in GDP to
some extent. However, Germany has had the slow-
est growth among all EU countries since 1995. Part
of the stabilisation of the share may therefore sim-
ply reflect the weak performance of the rest of the
economy. 
The value-added shares are only
approximate indicators of
employment shares, as firms in
the old EU countries may react to
the competitive pressures by
increasing the capital intensity of
their production and dismissing
unskilled labour with relatively
Figure 2.2
6 Statistisches Bundesamt (2004) and Sach-
verständigenrat zur Begutachtung der ge-
samtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2004),
pp. 361–364.
7 See Flaig et al. (2004). 
8 Other factors contributing to the extraor-
dinary pattern in Finland were the fall of
exports to the Soviet Union that con-
tributed to the large fall in 1989–91 and
the recovery from the deep Finnish reces-
sion in the early 1990s, that contributed to
the recovery in the share of manufacturing
in GDP.low value added per capita. Indeed, Figure 2.3 shows
that the decline in manufacturing employment shares
is more pronounced than the decline in value added
shares. 
3. The general motives for outsourcing and 
offshoring activities
Despite the media attention that outsourcing and off-
shoring is currently receiving, the academic literature
on this topic is mostly recent, diverse and relatively
scarce. 
Outsourcing as a reason for change in industrial
structures, with outsourcing as a particular form of
vertical disintegration, is emphasized by Grossman
and Helpman (2002, 2003). They argue that outsourc-
ing has been increasing in recent years due to
improvements in communication technologies and the
reduction of transaction costs between intermediate
and final goods producers. In related work, McLaren
(2000, 2003) argues that globalisation has increased
the thickness of markets and that thicker markets
imply less vertical integration.9
Another related idea is suggested by Casella and
Rauch (2002) and Rauch and Casella (2003), who
argue that outsourcing helps reduce informational
barriers to trade and that foreign intermediaries have
access to information that domestic firms would oth-
erwise not have. According to these hypotheses, trad-
ing services are an important
aspect of outsourcing. This is
similar in spirit to Feenstra,
Hanson and Lin (2002). These
authors show that Chinese
imports to the United States are
to a large extent channeled
through intermediaries in Hong
Kong and they view this as a
form of outsourcing trading ser-
vices that indicates benefits to
firms from informational advan-
tages of the Hong Kong interme-
diaries. 
A related question is that, given
that a firm has decided to out-
source and offshore part of the
production process, where to outsource. Hanson,
Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) show that distance is
among the most important factors in the decision to
outsource in US data, next to tax differences and dif-
ferences in labour cost. While not surprising, this
finding is particularly important for Europe, as the
proximity of Eastern Europe allows small and medi-
um-sized firms to outsource parts of their production
processes to the new members of the European
Union, which are close-by neighbours.
4. Opening trade with the ex-communist countries:
Low-wage competition at the extreme
While these are important motives that certainly play
a role in explaining outsourcing, it seems to us that
the idiosyncratic shock to the world trading system
that came about with the end of the communist
regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s was of par-
ticular importance. The more or less sudden opening
of trade between devastated, poor ex-communist
countries and the highly productive and rich western
countries was like opening the weirs between two
lakes of different height. Much of what has happened
to international trade since that time can be explained
by this picture, including the rapid emergence of out-
sourcing and offshoring activities. 
In particular, outsourcing and offshoring is one way
of taking advantage of the low labour cost in the east-
ern European accession countries. Figure 2.4 gives an
idea of how large the relocation incentives may be by
comparing the wage costs for industrial workers




9 See also the CESifo Forum (summer 2004) for a further discussion
on the consequences of outsourcing.EEAG Report 43
Chapter 2
Figure 2.4 shows that the hourly labour cost in most
Western European countries exceeds the labour cost
in the new EU member countries by a factor of five to
ten.10,11 Moving parts of the production process to
Eastern Europe is therefore not a marginal saving for
the firms but a large discrete jump in reducing total
labour costs. Clearly this plays a major role in the
location choice of newly established firms and is large
enough in magnitude to justify a relocation of already
existing plants if the share of
labour cost in total production
cost is large enough.12
Figure 2.5 indicates that the share
of FDI in GDP that flows to the
countries in net terms is negative-
ly related to the hourly labour
cost. In particular the eastern
European countries, which have
the lowest wages within the EU,
are the ones that have received
the largest share of FDI. This is
not identical but likely to be high-
ly correlated with offshoring and
outsourcing.13
A strong link between wages
and direct investment flows has
also been found by Marin,
Lorentowicz and Raubold
(2003) and in a most recent
study of the Ifo Institute by
Becker, Ekholm, Jäckle and
Muendler (2004). The latter
have exploited the voluminous
direct investment data base of
the Bundesbank that had not
previously been accessible. They
found that German and Eastern
European workers are close sub-
stitutes rather than comple-
ments and that a wage increase
in Germany has a significant
and sizable positive impact on
the number of jobs created by




13 Normally FDI statistics give little information of green-field
investment. The lion’s share of measured investment is purchases of
existing firms and retained earnings within such firms. In Eastern
Europe, these items are unlikely to be large, however, due to the fact
that communism did not leave many functioning existing firms. 
14 In the recent literature there is a consensus that domestic and for-
eign workers are substitutes. However previous studies, some came to
different conclusions. Braconier and Ekholm (2000) found a substi-
tutability for high income countries, but not for low income coun-
tries. Braconier and Ekholm (2001) found in the same data set, how-
ever, that outsourcing of Swedish firms to Eastern Europe has trig-
gered both a relocation of jobs from Sweden to Eastern Europe and,
to an even larger extent, a relocation of jobs of Swedish companies
that where already outsourced to Southern Europe. Brainard and
Riker (1997 and 2001) found for a set of US multinationals that par-
ent employment and affiliate employment in low-wage countries are
weak substitutes, while affiliate employment in different low-wage
countries are strong substitutes. However, they also reported com-
plementarity between affiliate employment in different types of
countries. In particular in their 2001 paper, which uses an updated
data set, they confirmed the evidence of substitutability. Konings
and Murphy (2001) found evidence of substitutability, although only
at the 10 percent significance level, for a set of EU firms. See Ekholm
(2003) for an overview.
10 Wages for workers in the new industrial locations of Eastern
Europe are higher than average wages as shown above. Outsourcing
and offshoring from Western Europe imply substantial wage differ-
ences within the new accession countries. 
11 For a more detailed analysis for the economic performance of the
accession countries, see our 2004 EEAG Report.
12 In Chapter 3, we make suggestions on how to overcome the high
labor cost problems of the Western European countries.5. Impact on wages
While it is clear that outsourcing and offshoring activ-
ities are driven by wage differences, there is less evi-
dence for the reverse causality. Theoretically, out-
sourcing reflects changes in international cost struc-
tures and productivity and thereby major shifts in
comparative advantage. Such shocks will have the ini-
tial impact that some factors will earn lower income
or lose employment if factor prices are rigid.
Outsourcing is like technical progress, which may or
may not hurt the different types of labour in the econ-
omy. The effects on the income distribution depend,
among other things, on the relative capital intensities
of the sectors that experience and do not experience
outsourcing. In particular whether a factor will gain
or lose depends on whether it is a complement or a
substitute to the factor that has become more abun-
dant by opening trade (see, for example, Jones 2003,
Kohler 2004 and Bhagwati et al. 2004). Clearly those
wage earners who are substitutes to the low-wage
earners who offer their labour abroad and who trigger
off outsourcing and offshoring are hurt. They have to
accept wage reductions to preserve their jobs. By con-
trast, those who offer labour that is complementary to
the low-wage earners abroad will gain. Theoretically,
it is even possible that the average wage rate rises. 
From an empirical perspective it seems clear that low-
skilled wage earners, basically industrial workers, will
lose, as there is an abundance of people in the ex-com-
munist countries including China who are now offer-
ing their labour for low-skilled industrial jobs.15 And
it may also seem plausible that highly skilled individ-
uals whose services are complements to these large
numbers of low-skilled workers will gain. However, it
is unclear where the borderline between skilled and
unskilled labour lies. According to a study of
Geishecker and Görg (2004), even German workers
with a normal school degree and accomplished voca-
tional training programme belong to the group of
losers, and only workers with a university degree can
clearly be identified as winners. If this is true, then
substantial fractions of wage earners in Germany are
likely to belong to the group of losers. 
This view is implicitly confirmed by Marin (2004)
who found that outsourcing to Eastern Europe does
not only involve low-skilled labour, as is often
assumed, but includes high-skilled labour, too.
Labour markets in Eastern Europe are not compara-
ble to labour markets in third-world countries. Rather
a high degree of skill abundance seems to prevail.
However, Marin finds only few negative effects on
jobs of outsourcing from Germany and Austria. 
The empirical studies that try to estimate the impact
of international outsourcing on wages face the diffi-
culty of separating the effects of outsourcing from the
technological changes in cost and production that
often are the initial reason for outsourcing. These
studies must also consider the closely related issue of
skill-biased technical change and its role in the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers that
widened in the 1980s and 1990s.16 Feenstra and
Hanson (2001) survey the empirical literature that has
attempted to estimate the reasons behind the widened
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the
US. This literature has employed several related
methodologies, for example estimations of demand
for skilled labour, price-cost conditions or economy-
wide GDP functions to study the role of outsourcing.
Feenstra and Hanson conclude that in addition to
skill-biased technical change, “international trade is
an important explanation of the increased wage gap”.
However, the quantitative results in these studies are
sensitive to the framework employed and also to the
variables used to measure skill-biased technical
progress. 
6. Outsourcing, factor price equalisation and the
welfare state: how to evaluate the process
The question that arises is how to evaluate the pat-
terns of industrial restructuring documented above.
In principle, there is a strong presumption that the
countries between which trade is opened up will expe-
rience gains from trade, because they can specialise in
those sectors where they have comparative advantages
and move away from others where they have disad-
vantages. As a rule, a country will gain more the fur-
ther the price ratios of its products move away from
the price ratios that prevailed, or would have pre-
vailed, in autarchy, because then they can specialise
more and buy imports at increasingly lower prices in
terms of exported goods. Outsourcing and offshoring
EEAG Report 44
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15 Meshcheryakova (2004) attempts to estimate the income losses of
low-skilled workers in a two-country version of a neoclassical
growth model. In a calibration exercise with data from the United
States and China she finds that outsorcing reduces the lifetime utili-
ty of low-skilled workers in the US.
16 Katz and Autor (1999) give the estimates that between 1979 and
1995 the real wages of U.S. workers with more than 16 years of edu-
cation rose by 3.4 percent, while those with less than 12 years of edu-
cation fell by 20.2 percent.EEAG Report 45
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are important elements that contribute to gains from
trade. 
If one sees the world as consisting of two kinds of
countries, the highly industrialised countries of the
West and the ex-communist countries that recently
joined the world trading system, both groups of coun-
tries will unambiguously gain if they open up trade
under free competition, since before trade was
opened, the commodity price ratios differed widely.
Both groups of countries will be able to import goods
more cheaply than it would have been possible for
them to produce these goods themselves. 
However, when the world is seen in a more disaggre-
gated way and if various institutional constraints that
limit the role of free competition are taken into
account, the gains from trade are less obvious.
Consider, for example, a third group of countries, say
the resource-rich developing countries of the south.
Then it may well be the case that the terms of trade
will not improve for the countries of the West if the
ex-communist countries join the trade between the
West and the developing countries as a third partner.
Suppose, for example, that the West has specialised in
skill-intensive goods and that the ex-communist coun-
tries will do the same. Then the terms of trade for the
West may worsen in the sense that the price of skill-
intensive goods in terms of natural resources falls,
moving closer to the level that would have prevailed in
the West in autarchy. In this case. the West’s gains
from trade will decline. This is the fear that
Samuelson (2004) expressed recently. The recent rise
of the world oil price, which many have attributed to
increasing demand from China, can be interpreted in
the light of this argument. However, as has been
shown by Dixit and Grossman (2004), the empirical
conditions for this scenario to be relevant are unlikely
to be satisfied. 
A more relevant concern for the countries of Europe
seems to be that the condition that the markets in the
countries among which trade is opened operate com-
petitively is not satisfied. Gains from trade and spe-
cialisation require that the countries internally be
organised such that the factors of production, capital
and labour in particular, can freely move from the dis-
advantaged to the advantaged sectors. There are
always disadvantaged sectors with dying firms and
growing unemployment. The crucial test for gains
from trade is how quickly a country is able to return
to full employment after trade is opened and jobs in
the import-competing industries are destroyed by cre-
ating new jobs in the rising export sectors. 
This test applies to outsourcing and offshoring activi-
ties in particular. The domestic job losses they incur
must be compensated for by new jobs that are estab-
lished in other parts of the economy. To be concrete,
an efficient process of international outsourcing and
offshoring would imply that the work time set free in
the firms that dislocate their labour is used in other
sectors such as services or construction whose output
cannot easily be provided by the ex-communist low-
wage countries or in downstream manufacturing sec-
tors that specialise in bazaar activities.
Some European countries seem to meet the test. The
UK where unemployment declined despite substantial
job losses in manufacturing is a good example. The
UK seems to have succeeded well in managing the
structural change towards a service-based economy.
Its growth and employment performance in the last
ten years has been outstanding.
Other countries seem to be having more difficulties.
Germany, which has been growing more slowly than
any other EU country since 1995, is the most promi-
nent example. However, the views on Germany differ
widely. A number of German researchers have argued
that Germany is able to master the current period of
globalisation well and to capture gains from trade
since the exporting sectors’ employment and value-
added shares are growing relative to the rest of the
economy. The Federal Statistical Office has been able
to demonstrate that this is the case in Germany
despite the pronounced tendency to reduce the value
added per unit of export. The growth in the export
volume overcompensated the declining production
depth due to outsourcing and offshoring. The same
researchers see it as a confirmation of Germany’s
gains that the export surplus has increased in recent
years.17
This line of reasoning escapes our understanding of
how economies function. As explained, opening trade
with a number of previously excluded countries
means specialisation, and specialisation means
increased exports and imports. Sectors where a coun-
try has a comparative advantage expand, export their
products and absorb more factors of production such
that their value added increases. Other sectors where a
country has a disadvantage decline, giving way to
17 Sinn (2005). imports. They lose the factors of production, and
hence their value added falls behind. Showing that
value added and employment in the exporting sectors
have increased relative to the rest of the economy is
close to a tautology. It implies that countries spe-
cialise, but it does not in itself imply gains from trade,
let alone an optimal reaction to international trade. 
One reason why increasing exports cannot, by them-
selves, be interpreted as signs of gains from trade has
been given by Brecher (1974) in a Heckscher-Ohlin
trade model with a minimum wage constraint. If the
minimum wage constraint applies in the high-wage,
capital-abundant country, the labour-intensive sector
of that country has difficulties surviving the low-wage
competition from abroad, setting free an excessive
amount of capital and labour. The capital-intensive
exporting sector then expands more rapidly, and the
country overspecialises. The capital intensive goods
are used to buy more labour intensive goods abroad,
replacing the reduced national production of such
goods. Both imports and exports grow beyond their
optimal size. There is an export boom, but it is a sign
of a pathologic reaction of the economy rather than
of a successful reaction to international trade, be-
cause the capital-intensive sector is unable to absorb
the workforce set free in the labour-intensive sector.
This example shows that it is not always better to
export more and to generate more export-induced
value added.18 While it is debatable whether this case
already applies to Europe, the argument makes it clear
that a high level of exports in itself cannot possibly be
interpreted as a sign for gains from trade if wages are
sticky.
Similarly, the mere fact that a country has an export
surplus does not show gains from trade either. By def-
inition, an export surplus is a capital export. While a
capital export could be the sign of welfare-improving
intertemporal trade, it could also be the consequence
of bad national policies.19 When wages are fixed above
the market clearing level and factor proportions can-
not react to the forces of globalisation, a capital
export can even be taken as an indicator of job
exports. It is difficult to say to what extent this case
applies to the European economies, but it is clear that
a trade surplus in itself cannot be interpreted as a sign
of gains from trade. 
An indication that the case of inflexible labour mar-
kets is relevant for Europe is the increasing unem-
ployment from which many European countries have
suffered in recent years. Germany, whose unemploy-
ment has risen for more than three decades, is a char-
acteristic example. In the period from 1995 to 2003,
when the reduction in domestic production depth was
particularly pronounced, 1.9 billion hours of work
disappeared from the German manufacturing sector
(industrial production without construction), which is
a decline of 14 percent. However, only 290 million
additional hours of work were created in the rest of
the economy. There was a net loss of 1.61 billion
hours of work in the period under consideration. This
undoubtedly was not a sound development that
speaks of gains from trade. 
Outsourcing and offshoring per se do not cause
unemployment. The problem is instead the inflexibili-
ty of the labour market. In order for the structural
change accompanying specialisation to operate effi-
ciently and bring about gains from trade, wages would
have to give way as a reaction to increased low-wage
competition from abroad. However, both trade
unions and the relatively high replacement incomes of
the welfare state have prevented wages from falling.
Replacement incomes, such as unemployment bene-
fits and social aid, act as lower bounds on the wage
distribution. They were not a problem when growth
was high and wages were rising, because they then fol-
lowed wages at a sufficient distance. However, when
trade is opened with huge low-wage areas like China
and Eastern Europe, wages come under pressure while
the replacement incomes stemming from better times
prevent them from giving way. Thus, too much out-
sourcing and offshoring activity may have been
induced, and too few jobs may have been created in
the rest of the economy.This has added to the already
existing unemployment problems caused by the inter-
action of macroeconomic shocks in the past and
unfavourable institutional conditions.
This is the general dilemma of market integration
between high-wage and low-wage countries. Such
integration will bring about gains from trade, but only
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18 For a more extensive discussion, see Sinn (2005).
19 A current account surplus by definition is equal to an export of
capital. Suppose we start with the identity Y-T=C+I+G+(X-M),
where Y (income) –T (taxes) is the disposable income, C is con-
sumption, I is investment, G is government expenditure and X
(exports) –M (imports) is the current account surplus. A reformula-
tion of this equation yields (Y-T-C)+(T-G)=I+(X-M), where private
and public saving stand on the left hand side and investment and the
current account surplus on the right hand side. National savings are
obviously allocated in the open economy towards domestic invest-
ment and net exports. Therefore, by definition, an export surplus is a
capital outflow. This identity of course says nothing about the
causality. Part of the current European export surplus may result
from the attempt to export capital, part may be due to low internal
demand which implies low imports. However, the low internal
demand may in turn result from the low investment volume which
itself may reflect the availability of attracting outsourcing and off-
shoring alternatives. EEAG Report 47
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in the sense that the winners gain more than the losers
lose. The reason is that market integration tends to
bring about factor price equalisation or at least a nar-
rowing of the gap in factor prices. As argued above, at
least wages for unskilled labour in the EU-15 come
under pressure, and by the same mechanism wages in
the new accession countries are lifted. Thus there are
losers in the west, and in the current situation the
losers may well comprise substantial fractions of the
workforce of the Western European countries. 
It is understandable that unions and politicians try to
stem the tide and prevent the distributional conse-
quences.20 However, if they do that by fixing wages
and social replacement incomes, they prevent the nec-
essary adjustments of the economy and hence the
gains from trade from occurring. There are no gains
from trade if political constraints make the corre-
sponding convergence of factor prices impossible. 
Nevertheless, the exporting sector of such an econo-
my may flourish for the reasons given by Brecher
(1974), as cited above. Also many firms in such an
economy may stay competitive. However, unemploy-
ment shows that an increasing fraction of the work-
force may at the same time have lost its competitive-
ness (see Box 2.1)
In this sense, the judgment of international outsourc-
ing and offshoring is not trivial. In principle, these are
good and natural consequences of a fruitful integra-
tion of markets. However, the inflexibility of wages in
the west may create more shifts in production process-
es and a more rapid reduction in domestic production
depth than is optimal. The subtle
truth is that a process that is good
in principle may go too far
because of the inflexibility of
Western labour markets. 
The EEAG had previously
argued that one of the most pow-
erful tools in the fight against
unemployment is a partial con-
version of the welfare state from
the payment of wage replacement
incomes to a policy of perma-
nently paying wage subsidies to
the very low-skilled, and it had
presented a system of activating social aid to accom-
plish this without increasing the cost of the welfare
state. This strategy remains the appropriate medicine
against an overly rapid process of outsourcing and
offshoring, because it establishes the wage flexibility
necessary to bring about the gains from trade while at
the same time compensating the victims of factor
price equalisation.21
7. Conclusions
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the integration
of China into the world trading system, international
trade in goods and services has increased significant-
ly, given that the factor endowments and hence rela-
tive prices differ substantially. Trade in intermediate
products has developed particularly rapidly due to
outsourcing and offshoring activities of firms that
have tried to make use of the huge wage differences
between the formerly separated parts of the world.
This has caused the domestic value added per unit of
output – the so-called production depth – to decline in
many sectors.
This trend towards a reduction in production depth
has been particularly strong in the manufacturing sec-
tor. This trend of de-industrialisation is related to
outsourcing and offshoring activities of domestic
firms. Parts of the production process have been
moved to low-wage countries. In particular the new
members of the European Union in Eastern Europe
are the focus of a new restructuring of the economy. 
Outsourcing and offshoring are not limited to manu-
facturing only. In Germany, for example, it has been
Box 2.1
Competitiveness
In the discussion on outsourcing, and the process of globalisation in general,
the term “competitiveness” is often used in a misleading way. Often, it is
argued that the lower cost of inputs from Eastern Europe makes Western
European firms more competitive and therefore gives them an advantage in
placing their products on the world markets. This undoubtedly is the case
However, it is not the most interesting and relevant form of competitiveness.
While the firms – and the owners of capital in general – including perhaps
skilled workers remain competitive and even increase their competitiveness
through outsourcing, it is the unskilled workers who are unable to compete.
T h em a i nc o n c e r n sr a i s e da b o u t  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s si nt h i sc h a p t e ri st h a t
workers in a highly regulated labour market may not be able to compete with
the low-wage alternatives that are opening up for internationally mobile
capital in Eastern Europe.
20 The implications of labour market unionisation on the effects of
outsourcing are considered by Skaksen (2004). He shows that poten-
tial outsourcing makes the members of trade unions worse off rela-
tive to capital, while the reverse is true after realised outsourcing.
Zhao (2001) argues that unionisation in vertically related markets
gives firms incentives to outsource.  21 See Chapter 6 of our 2002 report.shown that these phenomena
apply to the export sector as a
whole. From 1991 to 2002, the
additional unit of real exports,
on average, induced a 55 percent
increase in intermediate imports.
Only 45 percent of the increase in
real exports implied additional
value added in the exporting
country, a phenomenon that has
been caricatured as the “bazaar
effect”. If a country specialises in
bazaar activities, its factors of
production move from other sec-
tors towards such activities such
that their value added rises, but
the export and import volumes
rise even faster than this. 
In principle, outsourcing activities may lead to gains
from trade for all countries involved. The low-wage
countries of Eastern Europe and Asia find new and
profitable employment activities for their affluent
labour forces and are able to increase their wages. And
the high wage countries of the West are able to with-
draw part of their endowments of labour and capital
from labour intensive sectors to use them more pro-
ductively in the service and high-tech sectors where
they may have comparative advantages. Outsourcing
and offshoring is just a special form of international
trade that can be expected to boost world GDP and
world welfare, because it allows the countries to spe-
cialise in their comparative advantages. 
However, for the gains from trade to occur it is essen-
tial that the domestic factor markets in the West are
flexible enough to allow for the necessary factor
migration between shrinking and expanding sectors.
While capital markets in Europe do seem to meet this
requirement, labour markets are quite rigid. For one
thing, national job protection measures prevent work-
ers from moving easily between sectors. For another,
the repercussions of collective wage agreements and
the welfare state that is based on wage replacement
payments prevent the necessary wage flexibility. Gains
from trade go hand in hand with a tendency towards
factor price equalisation. In particular, the specialisa-
tion on more capital intensive production requires
lower wages so as to prevent unemployment. If wages
are rigid, this process cannot take place. The sectors
where the West has a comparative disadvantage
shrink too quickly setting more labour free than use-
ful, and the growing sectors where there is a compar-
ative advantage do not create enough additional jobs
even though they grow faster than optimal. A growing
level of unemployment results. 
In some European countries we see strong signs of
such a deficiency of the adjustment process. Thus the
EEAG advocates policies to make the labour market
more flexible. The necessary measures include the
measures it recommended in earlier years’ reports.
They range from more limited job protection policies
via opening clauses for collective wage agreements
towards a policy of activating social aid that changes
the role of the welfare state from a competitor to a
partner of private enterprises. In addition, of course,
increasing daily work times as recommended in
Chapter 3 of this report, would be an easy way to alle-
viate the problems.
Appendix on Germany 
As argued above, for Germany the process of interna-
tional outsourcing and offshoring seems to be partic-
ularly pronounced. Figure 2.6 illustrates that the
value-added share of the manufacturing sector has
decreased from more than 40 percent in 1970, to less
than 25 percent in 2003. Comparably, the share of
employment of the manufacturing sector in total
employment (including government, without self-
employed) has declined from 36 percent in 1970 to
only 20 in 2002.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the patterns of industrial
changes in Germany in more detail. Particularly
important are the developments of real output and
real value added as reported in the input-output sta-
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tistics of the German Federal Statistical Office (the
nominal shares are also reported in Figure 2.6). Real
output is the inflation-adjusted total value of indus-
trial products in a given year. The value added is that
part of the value that was generated by the manufac-
turing sector itself. Value added is equivalent to the
primary income of the industrial production sector,
plus taxes, which is in principle identical to the gross
profits, interest payments, wage payments, gross
salaries, including social insurance payments and
indirect taxes. Not included are intermediate goods
obtained elsewhere. Due to these intermediate goods,
the real output is always larger than value added. This
does not imply that the indexed real output figure
need to lie above the index of value added. If both
values were to grow at the same rate, the share of
intermediate goods would remain constant over time.
As Figure 2. 7 illustrates, this is clearly not the case in
Germany.
Instead, one can see that the two lines drift apart in
the course of the late 1990s. While real output has
grown by 18.3 percent, which is roughly equal to the
EU average GDP growth, value added has only
grown by 4 percent. Apparently, a growing share of
German manufacturing production is due to a
process of outsourcing to other sectors and coun-
tries and to offshoring. In the light of these devel-
opments, it is not surprising that employment in the
German manufacturing sector has been reduced by
8.3 percent.
The question is where the pro-
duction of intermediate goods
has moved to. In principle, both
domestic and foreign sectors
could be supplying the interme-
diate products. Figure 2.7 shows
that the latter of the two is more
important. Imported intermedi-
ate products have grown by
45 percent in the time period
from 1995 to 2003, twice as fast
as industrial production and
about 10 times as fast as value
added. Despite the cyclical
downturn in 2002 and 2003, this
shows that increasing fractions
of industrial output have been
moving abroad. 
The share that the German
manufacturing industry had in
its own increase in real output
was merely 11 percent; 38 percent was due to inter-
mediate products from other branches in the
domestic economy, and a remarkable 51 percent
was due to intermediate products imported from
other countries. This corresponds to the data pro-
vided by the Federal Statistical Office, as cited
above in the main text, according to which 55 cents
of each real additional euro of German export is
directly used for the purchase of imported interme-
diate goods. 
The shaded parts of the pie-diagram in Figure 2.7
indicate which shares of manufacturing production
have been crowded out by other sectors and other
countries, respectively. Had all three components of
real output (domestic production, foreign and domes-
tic intermediate goods) changed proportionately, the
share of the manufacturing sector’s own value added
in the increase in production would have been 49 per-
cent. The fact that the share is actually only 11 percent
is explained by an 8 percentage point increase of
domestic outsourcing, and a 30 percentage point
increase in foreign outsourcing and offshoring. The
reduction in the domestic depth of production is
therefore to an extent of four-fifths explained by shift-
ing production to foreign countries and only to one-
fifth by shifting production to other sectors in the
domestic economy that are not part of the manufac-
turing sector. 
Figure 2.7References
Amiti, M. and S.-J. Wei (2004), “Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is it
Justified?,” IMF Working Paper WP704/186.
Basu, S. and J. Fernald (1997), “Returns to Scale in U.S.
Manufacturing: Estimates and Implications,” Journal of Political
Economy 105, 249–83. 
Becker, S. O., K. Ekholm, R. Jäckle and M.-A. Muendler, “Location
Choice and Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and
Swedish Multinationals”, mimeo, Ifo Institute, November 2004.
Bhagwati, J., A. Panagariya and T. N. Srinivasan (2004), “The
Muddles over Outsourcing”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4),
93–114.
Braconier, H. and K. Ekholm (2000) “Swedish Multinationals and
Competition from High- and Low-Wage Locations”, Review of
International Economics 8, 448–61.
Braconier, H. and K. Ekholm (2001), “Foreign direct investment in
Central and Eastern Europe: Employment effects in the EU”, CEPR
Working Paper No. 3052.
Brainard, S. L. and D. Riker (1997), “U.S. Multinationals and
Competition from Low Wage Countries”, NBER Working Paper
No. 5959.
Brainard, S. L. and D. Riker (2001) “Are US Multinationals
Exporting US Jobs?,” in DavidGreenaway and Douglas R. Nelson,
eds., Globalization and Labour Markets, vol. 2, E. Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK and Northampton, 410–26.
Brecher, R. A. (1974), “Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of
International Trade”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 98–116.
Casella, A. and J. E. Rauch (2002), “Anonymous Market and Group
Ties in International Trade”, Journal of International Economics 58,
19–47.
Dixit, A. and G. Grossman (2004) “Samuelson Says Nothing About
Trade Policy”, mimeo, Princeton University.
Ekholm, K, (2003) “Industrial Structure and Industry Location in an
Enlarged Europe”, SIEPS Report No. 19, November.
Feenstra, R. C. (1996), “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of
Production in the Global Economy”, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 12, 31–50.
Feenstra, R. C. and G. H. Hanson (2001), “Global Production
Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages”,
Handbook of International Economics 4, forthcoming.
Feenstra, R. C., G. H. Hanson and S. Lin (2002), “The Value of
Information in International Trade: Gains to Outsourcing through
Hong Kong”, NBER Working Paper No. 9328.
Flaig, G., W. Nierhaus, O.-E. Kuntze, A. Gebauer, S. Henzel, O.
Hülsewig, A. Kaltschütz, E. Langmantel, M. Ruschinski, H.-W. Sinn
and T. Wollmershäuser (2004), “ifo Konjunkturprognose 2005:
Abgehängt von der Weltkonjunktur”,“ ifo Schnelldienst, 57(24), 15–56. 
Fujita, M., P. Krugman and A. Venables (1999), The Spatial Eco-
nomy: Cities, Regions and International Trade, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Geishecker, I. and H. Görg (2004), “Winners and Losers:
Fragmentation, Trade and Wages Revisited”, Discussion Paper 385,
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (2002), “Integration versus
Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117, 85–120.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (2003), “Outsourcing versus FDI
in Industry Equilibrium, Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 1, 317–27.
Hanson, G. H., R. J. Mataloni Jr. and M. J. Slaughter (2001),
“Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Firms”, NBER Working
Paper No. 8433.
Hild, R. (2004), “Produktion, Wertschöpfung und Beschäftigung im
Verarbeitenden Gewerbe”, ifo Schnelldienst 57(7) 19–27.
Jones, R. W. (2003), “Immigration vs. Outsourcing: Effects on
Labour Markets”, mimeo.
Jones, R. W. and H. Kierzkowski (2003), “International Trade and
Aggolomeration: An Alternative Framework”, mimeo.
Katz, L. F. and D. Autor (1999), “Changes in the Wage Structure and
Earnings Inequality”, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook
of Labour Economics, vol. 3A, Elsevier, Amsterdam, New York etc.,
1463–1555.
Kohler, W. (2004), “International Outsourcing and Factor Prices with
Multistage Production”, Economic Journal 114, 166–85. 
Konings, J. and A. Murphy (2001), “Do Multinational Enterprises
Substitute Parent Jobs for Foreign Ones? Evidence from European
Firm-level Panel Data”, CEPR Working Paper No. 2972, London.
Marin, D. (2004), “A Nation of Poets and Thinkers? Less so with
Eastern Enlargement, Austria and Germany”, Department of
Economics, University of Munich, discussion paper 2004–06. 
Marin, D., A. Lorentowicz and A. Raubold (2003), “Ownership,
Capital and Outsourcing: What Drives German Investment to
Eastern Europe?”, Department of Economics, University of Munich,
discussion paper 02–03.
McLaren, J. (2000), “Globalization and Vertical Structure”,
American Economic Review 90, 1239–54. 
Meshcherjakova, Y. (2004), “Macroeconomic Effects of Inter-
national outsourcing,” mimeo, Northwestern University.
Ng, F. and A. Yeats (2002), “Production Sharing in East Asia: Who
Does What for Whom and Why?”, in L. Cheng, and H. Kierzkowski,
eds.,  Globalization of Trade and Production in South-East Asia,
Kluwer Academic Press, New York.
Rauch, J. E. and A. Casella (2003), “Overcoming Informational
Barriers to International Resource Allocation: Prices and Ties”,
Economic Journal 113, 21–42.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2004), Erfolge im Ausland – Herausforderung im Inland,
Jahresgutachten 2004/05, Wiesbaden. 
Samuelson, P. (2004), “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm
Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization”,
Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 135–146. 
Sinn, H.-W. (2004a), Ist Deutschland noch zu retten?, 6th edition and
higher, Econ, Berlin.
Sinn, H.-W. (2004b), Mut zu Reformen. 50 Denkanstöße für die Wirt-
schaftspolitik, Beck (DTV), Munich. 
Sinn, H.-W. (2005), Basarökonomie Deutschland – Weltmeister oder
Schlusslicht?, forthcoming in ifo Schnelldienst.
Skaksen, J. R. (2004), “International Outsourcing when Labour
Markets are Unionized”, Canadian Journal of Economics 37, 78–94.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2004), Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnun-
gen. Input-Output-Rechnung. Importabhängigkeit der deutschen Ex-
porte 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2002, Wiesbaden.
Zhao, L. (2001), “Unionization, Vertical Markets and the Outsourcing
of Multinationals”, Journal of International Economics 55, 187–202. 
EEAG Report 50
Chapter 2